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Chinese Muslims in Taipei, Nanjing, 
and Shanghai
Ahmad Atif Ahmad
I. Introduction
Even before I participated in the Faculty Development International 
Seminar (FDIS) in the summer of 2006, I had been intrigued by the 
position of Chinese Muslims in the world, past and present. The first 
reason is the fact that Chinese Muslims may be seen as a community of 
double importance: China is a rising economic power and the Muslim 
world is in the political spotlight, given its strategic importance for 
countless historical and economic reasons. Secondly, one must note 
that there are twenty million Chinese Muslims today, a large number 
of people (although a small fraction of the 1.3 billion Chinese people 
and the 1.3 billion Muslim people worldwide). Most Chinese Muslims 
live in rural areas and maintain a traditional lifestyle, but some live 
in China’s growing urban settings. Urban Chinese Muslims present 
an interesting case for students of religion as they struggle with their 
complex identity while taking great pride in it. In this article I reflect 
on my visit to China to study the Chinese-Muslim communities in 
Taipei, Nanjing, and Shanghai, the three cities visited by seminar par-
ticipants. I focus on urban Chinese-Muslim identity and the prospects 
of Chinese Muslims as a distinct community within China and the 
Muslim world.
A word about the history of Islam in China is in order. Islam reached 
China in the 7th century CE, mostly through merchants who married 
into the local Chinese populations. The offspring of these marriages 
were the nucleus of a Chinese-Muslim community within the (Han) 
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Chinese majority. These Chinese Muslims are known as the Hui peo-
ple. The Hui have always been capable of assimilating easily into the 
majority because they and the Han are not readily distinguishable 
from each other (only in some parts of northwest China can the Hui be 
distinguished from the majority Han people by facial and other physi-
cal features).
Islam reached its zenith in China during the Yuan dynasty (1271–
1368 CE). During the early days of the Ming dynasty, a Chinese-Mus-
lim navigator by the name of Zheng He (1371–1435 CE) brought fame 
to the Chinese-Muslim community because his seven exploratory voy-
ages by sea reached as far as the eastern coast of Africa. Later, the so-
called Uighur people (also spelled Uyghur) and other people of Turkic 
and Mongolian stock added to the Chinese-Muslim population, as 
westward migration of Turkic tribes and eastward expansion of Chi-
nese territories turned people of Inner and Central Asia into members 
of the Chinese world.
China today recognizes ten separate Muslim nationalities (among 56 
Chinese nationalities), but more than 50% of Chinese Muslims belong 
to the Hui people. The Hui are known to be good businessmen, and 
many are also well known as national masters of the martial arts. As a 
people, the Hui are also recognized as a national minority, a status that 
grants them protection. A sign that they are acknowledged in China is 
that the red banner of the People’s Republic of China bears a large yel-
low star, representing the Han majority, and four smaller yellow stars, 
one of which represents the Hui people while the other three represent 
the Manchu, Mongol, and Tibetan peoples.
However, Chinese Muslims belong to a nation whose aspirations to 
be a major economic and political player in the world is characterized 
by nationalistic overtones, and nationalistic pride in China is almost 
inseparable from the glorification of the Han people, China’s historical 
majority. Most anthropologists observing China agree that the majority 
of China’s Han people are occasionally puzzled by, and often suspi-
cious of, their Hui fellow countrymen. The same can be said about the 
relationship between the Han and the rest of China’s Muslim commu-
nity, consisting, as I said, of peoples of mostly Turko-Mongolian eth-
nicities, including the Uighur community (which accounts for almost 
40% of Chinese Muslims) and other communities whose numbers are 
usually estimated in the hundreds of thousands. Furthermore, Chinese 
Muslims’ affinity with the Muslim world is not without its limitations, 
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since the worldwide Muslim community’s cultural and religious cen-
ters are quite distant from China’s centers of culture.
At any rate, Chinese Muslims’ position in the world deserves the 
attention of students of religion as well as students of the Chinese 
sphere, whether they are historians, political scientists, or sociologists 
and anthropologists. In the remainder of the article, I will propose that 
one need not overlook the similarities between urban Chinese Muslims 
and other urban Muslims, including Western Muslims who live in 
Europe and the United States. I will also suggest that the future of the 
Chinese-Muslim community is tied to the future of China itself, and 
whether they succeed in preserving their identity and continue to view 
themselves as both Chinese and Muslims depends first and foremost 
on their Chinese context.
II. Challenges Confronting Urban Chinese Muslims
Despite their unique position in the world, Chinese Muslims face chal-
lenges similar to those facing other Muslim communities worldwide. 
Not unlike other Muslim (and other religious) communities in the 
modern world, Chinese Muslims struggle with two major issues: 1) 
how to define the borders of their community and 2) how to define 
and read the history and traditions they consider their own.
A. Individual and Community
When it comes to identifying the borders of “personal” and “commu-
nal” identity, Chinese Muslims face the same challenge facing most 
modern Muslims. How does an individual in the Chinese-Muslim 
community balance his/her own needs and aspirations with those of 
the community as a collective entity? To make matters worse, the con-
cept of the “Muslim community” itself is rather vague. The Chinese 
Muslims I met kept referring to the importance in their lives of the 
worldwide Muslim community, but they ended up being more con-
crete when they talked about the small community of Chinese Mus-
lims they actually meet on a regular basis. For urban Chinese Muslims, 
their immediate Chinese-Muslim community provides a yardstick that 
gauges their commitment to their Muslim community. If these indi-
viduals accept being part of their small community, they begin the 
hard work of balancing the needs of this community with their own 
needs and aspirations. If they break away from their community, they 
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have a different set of challenges if they continue to relate to their 
Muslim identity. Some Chinese Muslims complain about their “broth-
ers and sisters,” who do not show up in the mosques or in community 
meetings. Others defend those who are often absent: “Success in life 
requires a lot of work, and work takes a lot of time,” they say.
In the metropolitan Chinese world, religious freedom comes as part 
of a package that also includes the freedom of the individual to leave 
his/her community. With urbanization and opportunity, many Chinese 
Muslims are left with a choice between a commitment to their per-
sonal success and a commitment to their community. Speaking about 
Chinese Muslims in Taipei, an imam (religious leader) says: “Taiwan 
is an island with 23 million inhabitants. The number of Muslims in 
Taiwan is anywhere between 40,000 and 60,000. Muslims enjoy a lot of 
freedom here, actually too much freedom! The political authorities do 
not suppress religious communities, and that benefits the members of 
the Muslim community, but economic and social freedom turns people 
away from the community.” A Shanghai imam thinks this applies to his 
city, too: “It is difficult to be a Muslim in Shanghai; everybody wants to 
do business and most people tend to focus on material success.” This 
may undermine traditional Muslim life over time, the imam believes, 
and as our conversation was ending, he emphasized that, “it is the role 
of religious leaders to continue to teach about Islam and Islamic values, 
and especially to educate the new generation of Chinese Muslims.”
Shanghai is a metropolis with a large population of young newcom-
ers who arrive to pursue their education and plan to work in Shanghai 
after finishing their studies. My informants reminded me that Shang-
hai as it stands today is a very “new” city: “There are very few people 
here in Shanghai whose grandparents are from Shanghai.” In Shang-
hai I also met Chinese-Muslim students who were visiting their friends 
in the city. One of these students is studying in Malaysia and plans to 
come back to Shanghai to work after he finishes his degree. He hopes 
to “have a job and be an activist and work to strengthen the Chinese 
Muslim community in Shanghai and other large Chinese cities.”
Many Shanghai graduate students had a broader range of interests 
compared with their fellow Chinese Muslims of older generations. 
These students were eager to discuss topics ranging from Edward 
Said’s Orientalism to Dan Brown’s Da Vinci Code to the work of Iris 
Chang, the Chinese-American activist and writer who wanted to draw 
the world’s attention to the Japanese killing of 300,000 Chinese people 
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in what is known as the 1937 Nanjing Massacre and who committed 
suicide at the end of 2004.
Compared to Taipei and Shanghai, Nanjing is a city with a strong 
sense of the past. In Nanjing one can find remnants of traditional Chi-
nese-Muslim communities that emphasize “communal” over “per-
sonal” identity. But as Nanjing moves in the direction of urbanization, 
fears of “imbalance” among Chinese Muslims are expressed. In Nan-
jing Chinese Muslims spoke about urbanization as a threat to Chinese-
Muslim communities. One imam spoke about the history of Muslims 
in Nanjing and some of the recent changes affecting the Muslim com-
munity there: “The shared history of Chinese Muslims is what brings 
them together, and the community will hold together in the future as 
long as they remember that history. The Chinese-Muslim community 
here is quite stable, but urbanization and migration to the cities might 
change the demographics quite rapidly.” I spoke through an inter-
preter to some of the older generation of Chinese Muslims in Nanjing, 
since most of them spoke neither Arabic nor English. They echoed 
what their imam said about the changes that may affect Nanjing Mus-
lims: “More and more people move to the city, and the government 
moves the city to us (!), and all this makes our traditional life more 
difficult.” These older lay interviewees have centered their lives on 
their community and worked in pre-industrial professions, mostly in 
agriculture and simple trading.
Hui Muslims disagree as to how they should deal with the chal-
lenges facing their collective identity as a distinct nation within the 
Chinese world. A Shanghai Muslim student says that the Hui people 
have historically preserved their identity by creating physical com-
munities around the mosques, and they should now consider creating 
“cyber communities” to replace the physical communities of the past 
yet serve the same function. Another student disagrees. She believes 
that so-called cyber communities have become fertile ground for sec-
tarian quarrels among Chinese Muslims, dividing them into Sunnis, 
Shi’is, Sufis, and rationalists. On occasion, they serve to create superfi-
cial acquaintances among students. In some cases they even serve as a 
matchmaking instrument to help young men and women in the Mus-
lim community get to know each other and marry.
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B. History and Religious Tradition
There are two basic questions a community has to answer with regard 
to its sense of history and the tradition it considers its own. First is the 
question of what counts as relevant history, and second is how this his-
tory is interpreted.
Many Chinese Muslims today have a strong sense of the importance 
of the history of Islam in China as an integral part of their identity. 
In Nanjing, where I visited the 15th-century Jingjue Mosque, I was 
reminded of the importance of Zheng He as an arch-father of Chinese 
Muslims. I was also told about Chinese Muslim scholars who are seen 
as polyglots, polymaths, and masters of the wisdom of China and of 
Islam. As an Egyptian guest, I was allowed into a special room with 
information about Chinese-Muslim scholars and notables, which also 
contained some of their relics, books, and paintings.
Chinese-Muslim religious leaders bring another layer of history to 
the lives of Chinese Muslims. These imams have studied Arabic, some-
times in Muslim institutions inside China, and sometimes in Arabic-
speaking countries. Through speeches by these imams, the history of 
Islam in the Middle East forces itself into the consciousness of Chinese 
Muslims.
Pre-Islamic Chinese history also occupies a place in Chinese-
Muslims’ consciousness. An interesting discussion with some Chi-
nese-Muslim students invited the question of whether the teachings 
of Kung Tzu (or Confucius, 551–470 B.C.) were compatible with the 
teachings of Islam. Some of these students assert that Confucianism 
and Islam are quite compatible. The notion of tao (the Way) of which 
Confucius spoke is equivalent to the notion of “truth” in the Islamic 
teachings, these students contend. Also, Confucius spoke of te (virtue) 
as an endowed or given character or set of qualities, which parallels 
the divinely endowed good character of which Sufi (mystic) Muslims 
spoke.
If these elements of what counts as relevant history distinguish Chi-
nese Muslims, so do their interpretations of the Islamic history that is 
common to them and to non-Chinese Muslims. Take the fact that some 
Chinese-Muslim communities allow women to lead the daily prayer, 
while most Middle Eastern Muslim communities will not allow that. 
Those who do not think it acceptable for Muslim women to lead the 
prayer (a majority in the Muslim world) will accuse Chinese Muslims 
of either ignorance or laxity and lack of religious commitment. In the 
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language of a Middle Eastern-Muslim visiting China: “Maybe they 
should go to a Muslim country to study Islam.” For that observer, it is 
clear that Chinese Muslims do not understand their Islamic tradition as 
well as they should. Some non-Chinese Muslims I met suggested that 
Chinese Muslims are “eclectic” about following Islam. These observ-
ers noted that some female Chinese Muslims will not shake hands 
with males but do not wear a headscarf. In the Muslim country from 
which these observers come, it makes more sense for a woman to wear 
a headscarf while taking the license of shaking hands with men. To 
them, if a woman will abandon wearing a headscarf, she may as well 
shake hands with men. “Eclectic” following of traditional values may 
be inevitable, and the choices that different communities make will 
also be inevitably different. Yet to say that one will “pick and choose” 
from their tradition is a question of “interpreting” this tradition.
III. Looking Ahead
If history is any indication of what the future holds for Chinese Mus-
lims, then one can expect a mixed picture of concord and conflict 
between Chinese Muslims and the rest of the Chinese nation. Chinese 
Muslims are aware of the differences that separate them from the rest 
of the Chinese people, but the Hui people in particular have an oppor-
tunity to be part of China’s national project of growth and develop-
ment and its attempt to achieve economic and political prominence 
in the world. As all privileges come at a price, being included in the 
Chinese project of the twenty-first century will require a measure of 
compromise on the part of Chinese Muslims.
The Hui are envied by many Chinese people because they are 
exempt from China’s one-child policy. Yet the Hui do not feel so privi-
leged. Many Shanghai Hui people are afraid of assimilation and have 
a strong sense of alienation. They also occasionally complain about 
discrimination at school and in the work place, e.g., when they refrain 
from drinking wine, because that is seen as a refusal to socialize. I 
invited two of the students I met in Shanghai to dinner with Macal-
ester faculty, and these students were surprised that it was socially 
acceptable for some faculty members to choose not to drink alcohol. 
One of the students said, “So, you actually have the freedom to either 
drink or not drink? In China’s business culture, you pretty much have 
the freedom to drink only!”
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The question of the degree to which compromise may be required 
from Chinese Muslims invokes analogies with European and Ameri-
can Muslims. Euro-Muslims and American Muslims have struggled 
with their desire to assert their complex identity and reject accusations 
of disloyalty or dual loyalty. Western Muslims reject any essentialist 
judgment of their status in the world as inherently problematic. Chi-
nese Muslims face a similar dilemma, despite the differences in the 
details. Chinese Muslims are not part of the colonial past that shapes 
Middle Eastern and Western relations. The history with which Chinese 
Muslims need to come to terms is mostly their own history as a nation 
(Huizhou or the Hui nation) within the Chinese nation. It is precisely 
in this history that one finds the roots of the hopes and fears of today’s 
Chinese Muslims.
It is clear that Chinese Muslims are “Chinese” as much as they are 
“Muslims.” They have been affected by China’s communist past. Even 
young Chinese Muslims told me stories about how they used to belong 
to the Communist Party and had to make a choice recently whether to 
be “communist” or “Muslim.” Furthermore, Chinese Muslims today 
are a good example of the state of transition that China is undergoing. 
They hope to see the future resolve some of their dilemmas and help 
them continue to be part of China as well as part of the multinational 
Muslim community.
This hope, however, may not be shared by all Muslims, especially 
those temporarily living in China. A Middle Eastern-Muslim woman, 
who speaks Chinese fluently and is married to a Chinese Muslim, told 
me that she likes the seriousness of Chinese business culture but thinks 
that Islam is probably a dying religion in China in the long run. She 
hopes to live in China for a few years and then take her husband to her 
country, where they can raise children. “Raising Muslim children here 
would be a difficult task,” she says. But hope overcomes fear in the 
language of some Chinese-Muslim graduate students in Shanghai. In 
the words of an articulate 25-year-old: “There is no point in lamenting 
the withering of traditional life. Most of us were born in villages in the 
northwest or the south of China, but village life is not the trend of the 
future. One has to answer the questions that are addressed to him and 
not the questions that were addressed to his parents!” Other young 
students nodded in agreement.
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IV. Conclusion
The hopes and fears expressed by Chinese Muslims living in metro-
politan areas tend to echo those expressed by many European and 
American Muslims. Metropolitan Chinese Muslims and Western Mus-
lims share a sense of relief for their freedom from religious oppres-
sion, mixed with antipathy for assimilation. A Chinese-Muslim imam 
summarized his community’s dilemma as that of “too much freedom.” 
The desirable aspect of freedom, in his view, is the politico-religious 
guarantee that no political oppression would be directed against mem-
bers of his religious community. The threatening part of freedom is 
that which allows an individual to break away from his/her commu-
nity with minimal losses. If the imam is correct in believing that Chi-
nese Muslims have “too much freedom,” then one of the unintended 
consequences of China’s ascension in the world economy might be 
the decline of the Chinese-Muslim community in the not-too-distant 
future. But if the new generation of Chinese Muslims can forge a new 
path for themselves as they try to balance their modernity with their 
religious identity, the Chinese-Muslim community may provide a 
model to be emulated by modern Muslims worldwide. •
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